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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The judgments of both the trial and intermediate appellate courts
were set aside. After an examination of the case, the Supreme
Court held that plaintiff was not purely a stakeholder, as there
was a strong possibility that plaintiff was obligated to all of the
defendants impleaded.
State v. Bayles,8 0 an expropriation case, presented only fac-
tual issues. Since no manifest error was found in the value of
the land placed by the jury of freeholders before whom the case
was tried, the judgment appealed from was affirmed.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
VENUE-CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF FAMILY
The venue rule that prosecutions for criminal neglect of
family could be brought only in the parish where the father
resided stemmed from the provision in Article 39 of the Civil
Code that the domicile of the mother and children is that of the
father. This limitation operated unfortunately in cases where the
husband had deserted the family, or the wife and children had
been forced to live with the wife's family as a result of the
husband's nonsupport. The parish where the neglected wife and
children resided was interested, but without jurisdiction to
prosecute the husband. The law enforcement officials of the
husband's domicile had jurisdiction over the offense, but there
was frequently a lack of interest on their part. In 1950, a special
venue provision was enacted which provided, in essence, that
the prosecution for nonsupport might be brought (1) in the par-
ish in which the person owing the support resided, (2) in the
parish in which the last matrimonial domicile was established,
or (3) in the parish in which the dependent established a justi-
fiable and bona fide separate residence.'
In State v. Maxie2 this broader venue provision was invoked
to support a prosecution for criminal neglect of family in a parish
where the widowed defendant's children had been living and
cared for by their maternal grandmother. Defense counsel argued
that the offense was committed and the proper place for prosecu-
80. 220 La. 506, 56 So. 2d 852 (1952).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Act 163 of 1950, La. R.S. 1950, 15:16.1.
2. 221 La. 518, 59 So. 2d 706 (1952).
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tion was in the parish of the father's domicile. In rejecting this
argument the Supreme Court pointed out that the decisions relied
upon were handed down prior to the 1950 venue provision. "This
later legislation," declared Justice Ponder, "was evidently enacted
because our jurisprudence was not in accord with the majority
rule in the. United States, and for the interest and welfare of
neglected wives and minor children. The majority rule recognizes
the right to prosecute the father where the wife or child becomes
dependent, regardless of his nonresidence, for that is the place
where the duty to support should be discharged." 8 Under the
new provision the offense of criminal neglect of family is treated
as a continuing offense, with the duty of support being owed in
any of the three parishes listed. To that extent "Article 39 of the
Civil Code must bow to this later legislation. '4
INTERRUPTION OF THREE YEAR PRESCRIPTION
In State v. Bradford5 the state had sought to toll the running
of the three year prescription period on a felony indictment by
urging that the defendant had delayed the trial by his motion
for a bill of particulars. On the first appeal the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the district court to ascertain whether the
state or the defense was responsible for the trial court's delay in
ruling on the motion.0 The trial judge found that the delay in
ruling on the bill of particulars had been occasioned by the sug-
gestion of the district attorney that the charge in question would
never be tried because the state had a better case against the
defendant in another division of the court. Defense counsel had
always been ready and available to argue the motion. Under
these circumstances, the delay was chargeable to the prosecution
rather than to the defense. The procedure followed placed an
appropriate emphasis on the fault element. Not every delay
which follows the filing of a motion by defense counsel will inter-
rupt the three year prescriptive period. Prescription would be
interrupted through "dilatory pleas"7 in a case where the state
sought to start actual prosecution of the case shortly before the
end of the three year period and the defendant prevented the
case coming to trial by a series of colorable preliminary motions.
3. 59 So. 2d 706, 708.
4. 59 So. 2d 706, 707.
5. 220 La. 176, 56 So. 2d 145 (1951).
6. 217 La. 32, 45 So. 2d 897 (1950), discussed by writer in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term-Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, 11 LOUISIANA LAW RsvIEw 236 (1951).
7. Art. 8, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:8.
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BAIL-OBLIGATION OF SURETY
The bail bond is given for the purpose of assuring the state
that the accused will appear in court to answer the charges
against him. Where the accused absconds and bail is forfeited,
our courts have not looked with favor upon hyper-technical
defenses raised by sureties. For example, it is well settled that
the surety cannot escape liability because the bond failed to set
forth correctly and fully the crime charged.8 In State v. Svoboda9
the bondsman for appearance of the accused at an extradition
hearing sought to defend against a forfeiture by alleging that the
requisition of the Illinois Governor had not been accompanied by
a sworn copy of the charge against the accused. Such a deficiency
would clearly have been a defense to the accused.'0 The court
held that the surety had no right to test the sufficiency of the
extradition papers by raising defenses that would have been
available to the defendant at the extradition hearing. It is the
surety's obligation that the accused will appear at the hearing to
answer the charges against him. It is not the surety's concern
that those charges be well founded or insufficient.
A number of technical defenses were appropriately overruled
in holding a surety on a bail bond in State v. Myers." An irregu-
larity in the bondsman's affidavit as to his property subject to
seizure could not be urged by the surety. The provision was one
for the benefit of the state, and the bondsman was "estopped" to
rely on his irregular affidavit to escape the obligation of the bond
he signed. The court also rejected the surety's argument that
he was entitled to notice of the arraignment of the accused. The
bond is conditioned upon the appearance of the accused to answer
the charges against him, and there is no requirement in the law
governing forfeiture proceedings 12 that the surety be notified
either of the arraignment or of the trial.
INDICTMENTS
Where the long form indictment is employed, great care must
be exercised to spell out all elements of the crime. The rule
that it is sufficient to charge a crime by stating the elements of
8. State v. Reams, 136 La. 48, 66 So. 393 (1914); State v. Arledge and
Posey, 48 La. Ann. 774, 19 So. 761 (1896).
9. 220 La. 260, 56 So. 2d 416 (1952).
10. State v. Hughes, 157 La. 652, 102 So. 824 (1925).
11. 221 La. 173, 59 So. 2d 111 (1952), followed with approval in State v.
Carter, 221 La. 547, 59 So. 2d 831 (1952).
12. La. R.S. 1950, 15:108.
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the crime as found in the statute has been held inapplicable to
the charge of a crime like gambling, which is defined in general
terms but may be committed in a number of different ways.1 3 In
State v. Richardson 4 " the information met this requirement of
particularity by specifically alleging that the gambling was com-
mitted by the operation of "a mechanical device known as a slot
machine." The indictment also included allegations as to the time
and place of the offense. However, the important consideration
in sustaining the sufficiency of the charge was the fact that the
type of gambling operation (a slot machine) was specified. It
should be noted that the safest procedure where a multiple crime
such as gambling is charged is to follow the short form indict-
ment authorized by Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. In following this procedure, it would have been sufficient
to charge that the defendant "did commit the crime of gambling
as defined by Article 90 of the Criminal Code."'15 If the defendant
needed additional information as to the type of gambling with
which he was charged, the same could be secured through a bill
of particulars. Frequently, where the short form is followed, the
indictment also includes a particularized statement of the offense
charged. Such additional allegations, without affecting the valid-
ity of the short form, are specifically authorized by the 1944
amendment to Article 235 and may be employed to avoid the
delay incidental to a bill of particulars.
A number of allegations which were considered essential to
the validity of prolix common law indictments have been desig-
nated as immaterial under modern codes of criminal procedure.
Article 234 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, 6 which
sets out a number of these "immaterial averments," specifically
states that no indictment shall be set aside "for omitting to state
the time at which an offense was committed where time is not of
the essence of the offense, nor for stating the time imperfectly."
In keeping with this liberal view as to allegations of the date or
time of the crime, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Mar-
inez,' 7 upheld a burglary indictment which had charged that
the crime was committed "between December 19, 1950, and
December 20, 1950." The trial judge had pointed out in his per
13. State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So. 2d 106 (1945).
14. State v. Richardson, 220 La. 338, 56 So. 2d 568 (1952).
15. State v. Davis, 208 La. 954, 23 So. 2d 801 (1945), noted in 6 LOUISIANA
LAW REviEW 715 (1946).
16. La. R.S. 1950, 15:234.
17. 220 La. 899, 57 So. 2d 888 (1952).
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curiam that the time of the crime could not be pin-pointed to a
single date, since the drug store burglarized was closed on the
night of December 19 and reopened in the daytime on December
20, during which period of time the alleged burglary was com-
mitted.1 8 The appellant's further claim, that the uncertainty as
to the exact date of the alleged crime might result in his being
placed in jeopardy a second time for the same burglary, was
rejected by the court, which correctly held that the accused could
not be again prosecuted for burglarizing that particular drug
store on either of the dates set out in the indictment. In view of
Article 234 the indictment in the Martinez case would have been
sufficient even if the date had been entirely omitted. 9 In such a
situation, if the date was material to a defendant relying on an
alibi, or in order to protect against the likelihood of a second trial
for the same offense, the defendant's remedy would be to secure
the necessary data through a bill of particulars.
JuRY LISTS-DIScRIMINATION
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a series of carefully written
opinions rendered during the past ten years, has provided a rather
clear pattern as to those jury commission procedures which will
meet the "equal protection" requirement of the Federal Consti-
tution.20 In the 1950 case of Cassell v. Texas,21 the United States
Supreme Court indicated a further tightening of the judicial
reins on this matter, and enunciated certain general principles
which necessitated a re-examination of state jury commission pro-
cedures. The most perplexing problem was raised by Mr. Justice
Reed's statement that "an accused is entitled to have charges
against him considered by a jury in the selection of which there
has been neither inclusion nor exclusion because of race. '22 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion similarly declared "It
is not a question of presence on a grand jury nor absence from it.
The basis of selection cannot consciously take color into account.""2
A practical application of this rule was presented in State v.
Green.24 After the Cassell decision the jury commission of Con-
18. 220 La. 899, 905, 57 So. 2d 888, 890 (1952).
19. See State v. Conega, 121 La. 522, 46 So. 614 (1908), applying La. Rev.
Stat. of 1870, § 1063, which declared that an indictment should not be held
insufficient for omitting to state the time of the offense.
20. Comment, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 548 (1948); Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1944-1945 Term, 6 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 521, 660 (1946).
21. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
22. Id. at 287.
23. Id. at 295.
24. 60 So. 2d 208 (La. 1952).
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cordia Parish adopted a new method of jury selection wherein a
special effort was made to consider eligible Negroes in the prepa-
ration of the general jury venire and the various jury lists.
Defense council in the Green case urged that the jury commission
had consciously taken color into account, and had sought to deter-
mine what would be proper Negro representation when they
placed ten or twelve Negro names on the general venire list of
three hundred and included three Negro names in the grand
jury list of twenty names from which the grand jury indicting
Green had been drawn. 25 In overruling this contention, the Loui-
siana Supreme Court concluded that a planned limitation upon
the number of Negro names had not been established. The Court
distinguished the Cassell case, where the jury commissioners had
consistently placed only one Negro name on each of twenty-one
successive grand jury lists.
Several guiding principles stand out in Justice McCaleb's
concise analysis of this point. It is inevitable that the jury com-
missioners will be conscious of the color line, and they should not
be charged with fault in making a forthright effort to provide
adequate Negro representation. While it is not necessary to
afford a full mathematical proportion of Negro veniremen, the
purposeful inclusion of a token number of Negroes on the various
jury lists would constitute a violation of the "equal protection"
requirements as interpreted in the Cassell case. The small pro-
portion of Negro names on the general venire list of three hun-
dred came very close to such a token representation. However,
the facts of the case indicated that the jury commissioners had
honestly and conscientiously attempted to secure a fair Negro
representation. The low percentage of names actually found on
the various lists had resulted from the fact that a large percentage
of the otherwise available Negroes were ineligible by reason of
illiteracy. It is inevitable that such special factors as illiteracy
and the inability of Negro wage earners to leave their jobs for
jury service will result in a rather small mathematical proportion
of Negro veniremen-and this despite a conscientious effort to
secure a fair representation of qualified Negroes.26
Another point in the Cassell case which was indirectly raised
in State v. Green was Justice Reed's statement that racial discrim-
25. The parish population consisted of 5,871 whites and 8,515 Negroes.
26. See State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945), where the
mathematical percentage was low despite the fact that the jury commis-
sioners had obtained special lists of Negro names from colored insurance
companies and fraternal organizations.
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ination may be established entirely by the exclusion of Negro
names from the jury lists for a single case, and does not depend
upon systematic exclusion continuing over a long period and
practices by a succession of jury commissioners.27 Applying the
converse of this principle, the trial judge in State v. Green had
refused evidence that discrimination had been practiced in the
parish for the past several years. While agreeing that the prac-
tices of past years are "generally of high relevance" in establish-
ing systematic racial exclusion, the Louisiana Supreme Court
agreed with the trial judge's holding that past practices in the
parish were irrelevant in view of the special circumstances of
the Green case. There the commissioners had adopted a new
method of jury selection for the express purpose of avoiding
discriminatory practices of the past. It is only where there is a
continuing method of jury selection that evidence of past prac-
tices are "of high relevance" in determining the issue of sys-
tematic exclusion.
JURORS-CHALLENGE FOR BIAS OR PREJUDICE
The defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury is a very
sacred one which receives specific recognition by Louisiana Con-
stitution and statutes.28 At the same time it has been construed
in a very practical manner. Widespread newspaper publicity con-
cerning important criminal cases has rendered it almost impos-
sible to select a jury from those who have no preconceived notion
of the case. Thus it is expressly provided in Article 351 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure that "An opinion as to guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, which is not fixed, or has not been delib-
erately formed, or that would yield to the evidence, or that could
be changed, does not disqualify the juror." In State v. Stroud29
the Supreme Court followed its previous holding30 that members
of the jury panel are not automatically disqualified by having
been in the courtroom and heard much of the evidence in the
case against a co-defendant who had been separately tried. The
juror in question had testified on voir dire examination that while
he had formed an opinion from the evidence heard, that opinion
was not fixed and he would readily yield to the evidence adduced
at the trial. Under those circumstances the Supreme Court upheld
27. 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950).
28. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9; La. R.S. 1950, 15:351(1).
29. 220 La. 806, 57 So. 2d 691 (1952).
30. State v. Frazier, 209 La. 373, 24 So. 2d 620 (1946).
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the trial judge's refusal to discharge the juror.3 1 Considerable
discretion is vested in the trial judge who has had the benefit of
hearing the juror's voir dire examination. His determination of
whether the prospective juror's previous knowledge of the case
has created a fixed opinion that would influence his verdict is
usually sustained by the Supreme Court.
In State v. Oliphant,32 however, the Supreme Court set aside
a murder conviction because the trial judge overruled defense
counsel's challenge for cause of two prospective jurors who had
revealed a fixed opinion of the defendant's guilt upon voir dire
examinations. Although the jurors stated that the opinion which
they had formed by reading and hearing about the case was not
fixed and that they could come into the trial with an open mind,
further interrogation by defense counsel indicated that the
jurors would actually enter the case with an initial belief of
guilt and that they would require evidence of innocence to change
that opinion. When questioned by the court, the jurors stated
that they understood and would adhere to the general rule that
the state has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Possibly the jurors actually entertained a present opinion
of guilt which was such as to destroy their ability to decide the
case impartially. Possibly they were merely confused by the
astute questioning of defense counsel. This risk, however, was
not one to which the accused should be required to submit. There
was no assurance when the jumbled and somewhat contradictory
answers of the prospective jurors were analyzed that their deci-
sions would be solely controlled by the evidence adduced at the
trial. After reviewing a transcript of the voir dire examinations,
the Supreme Court held that the trial judge committed a revers-
ible error in not sustaining the challenge for cause of these two
prejudiced (or confused) jurors. The defendant's rights to an
impartial jury and to a presumption of innocence are clearly
violated when he is placed on trial before jurors who admit that
their already formed opinions of guilt will continue until changed
by evidence submitted by the defense.
The prejudice which will render a juror subject to challenge
31. The fact that the prospective juror had heard the reading of a guilty
verdict against the previously tried co-defendant would normally result in an
inference of the defendant's guilt. However, in the case at bar, each defen-
dant was seeking to establish his innocence by shifting responsibility to the
other. Under those circumstances the hearing of the jury verdict in the
companion case would tend to create an inference of the defendant's inno-
cence rather than one of his guilt.
32. 220 La. 489, 56 So. 2d 846 (1952).
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for cause must relate specifically to the defendant or to the charge
being brought against him. In State v. MartinezB3 the defendants,
charged with burglary, sought to challenge a prospective juror on
the ground that his place of business had been burglarized four
times. On voir dire examination the juror had stated that his
prior unfortunate experiences would not prejudice him against
these particular defendants. On appeal the Supreme Court held
that the trial judge had properly' overruled the challenge of this
juror for cause. In the absence of evidence of specific prejudice
against the defendants, it was not enough to show that the juror
had reason to be antagonistic to burglars in general. In so ruling
Justice Ponder stated ."There is nothing in the testimony of the
juror nor evidence to show that the juror is prejudiced against
the defendants. We cannot assume that he is biased against the
defendants merely because his place of business has been bur-
glarized. '3 4 The only previous Louisiana decision in point is
State v. Allen.3 5 In that case a Negro defendant was charged
with the murder of a white man, and the Supreme Court held
that "[t]he mere fact, if it be true, that the father of one of the
jurors was killed by a Negro, and the further fact that the accused
was a Negro would not disqualify that juror from serving on the
jury." The Allen decision is not on all fours, since the objection
to the juror was first discovered after conviction and was raised
in a motion for a new trial. Also there was no allegation or proof
that the prior killing of the juror's father was a felonious homi-
cide. However, the opinion does give definite support to the idea
that a juror is not automatically disqualified on the ground of
prejudice because he has reason to be antagonistic to criminals
whose offenses are similar to that charged against the particular
defendant.
FORMER JEOPARDY
Where a crime continues through two or more parishes the
offender may be prosecuted in either parish,3 6 but there can be
only one prosecution for the offense. In State v. Sawyer,3 7 the
defendant's offense of drunken driving had taken place in two
parishes. Defendant Sawyer, a resident of Oak Grove in West
Carroll Parish, had driven over to Lake Providence, in adjoining
33. 220 La. 899, 57 So. 2d 888 (1952).
34. 220 La. 899, 909, 57 So. 2d 888, 891.
35. 203 La. 1016, 1024, 14 So. 2d 821, 823 (1943).
36. Art. 13, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:13.
37. 220 La. 932, 57 So. 2d 899 (1952).
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East Carroll Parish, where he engaged in some heavy drinking.
While drivinghis Buick car at an excessive rate of speed on the
return trip to Oak Grove, he ran into two cars parked on the
highway. As a consequence he was arrested on a warrant issued
by a Justice of the Peace of West Carroll Parish where the acci-
dent occurred, and charged with operating a vehicle while intoxi-
cated.A8 Upon his release, after making bond, the still inebriate4
defendant proceeded in a Ford pick-up truck toward Lake Provi-
dence where he was to join friends for a fishing trip. Based on
the above stated activities, two charges were filed against Sawyer
in West Carroll Parish. A bill of information was filed charging
him with driving his Buick automobile while intoxicated. The
grand jury indicted him for operating the Ford truck while in like
condition.
Sawyer must have believed that the authorities in his home
parish (West Carroll) would deal severely with him on the
drunken driving charge. Prior to the filing of the information
and indictment in West Carroll Parish, but subsequent to his
original arrest in that parish, he procured the filing of a drunken
driving charge against himself in East Carroll Parish. When
brought to trial in the apparently more favorable atmosphere
of the latter parish, Sawyer pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to pay a fine of $125. Later, when the two charges of drunken
driving came up for trial in West Carroll Parish, he filed pleas of
former jeopardy, relying on the rule that there can be only one
trial for a continuing crime. However, the artificially created
former jeopardy pleas fell short of their intended effect and were
overruled by the trial judge. Thereupon the defendant was con-
victed on both charges of drunken driving and sentenced to
sixty days in the parish jail for each offense.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed the case on a writ
of certiorari, but refused to set aside the dual convictions. Two
interesting former jeopardy principles were involved in the
decision. First, the prior trial in East Carroll Parish could not
be urged as a bar to the West Carroll prosecutions, since the East
Carroll court had been without jurisdiction to try the defendant.
The prior arrest in West Carroll Parish had given the court in
that parish exclusive plenary control of the case. It is a well
settled principle of criminal procedure that to constitute former
38. Art. 98, La. Crim. Code of 1942; La. R.S. 1950, 14:98.
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jeopardy the court in which the first trial took place must have
had jurisdiction.8 9
Secondly, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions on two
separate charges of drunken driving despite the fact that they
had both been committed in connection with a single drinking
spree. The charge of drunken driving in connection with the
operation of the Buick car had ended, according to the court, with
the accident which occurred just outside of Oak Grove. That was
one crime. The driving of the Ford truck, although the same
drunken condition may have continued throughout, began an hour
or two after the wreck of the Buick car. It was characterized as
"an entirely different project, wholly disconnected from the other
offense." It is interesting to conjecture as to whether the time
interval or the fact that dlifferent cars were driven played the
greater part in the court's conclusion that two separate offenses
of drunken driving had been committed. Probably the time ele-
ment was most significant. If, immediately after wrecking his
Buick car, the defendant had continued on his inebriated way in
the Ford truck, it might very logically have been insisted that
the whole affair constituted but one crime and that a dual prose-
cution would constitute double jeopardy.
INSANITY DEFENSE--HEARrNG AND LUNACY COnVnSSION
In State v. Bentley40 defense counsel was relying on the dual
insanity defenses-insanity at the time of the crime as a complete
defense, and present insanity as a bar to present trial. The motion
for a lunacy commission was supported only by general conclu-
sions as to the effects of an early head injury to the accused.
Based upon the insufficiency of these recitals, and the trial judge's
interrogation of the accused in his private chambers, the judge
ruled that the appointment of a lunacy commission was unneces-
sary. In upholding the trial judge's refusal to appoint a lunacy
commission, the Supreme Court stressed the fact that the appoint-
ment of a lunacy commission to examine the mental condition of
the accused is clearly discretionary with the trial judge, "and his
ruling in this respect is never disturbed on appeal except where
it has been manifestly abused."' 4' If evidence submitted in sup-
port of the motion had raised a substantial doubt as to the defen-
39. Art. 279, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:279.
40. State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893, 54 So. 2d 137 (1951).
41. 219 La. 893, 896, 54 So. 2d 137, 138. Accord: State v. Green, 60 So. 2d
208, 213 (La. 1952).
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dant's present ability to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him or to assist in his defense, the court's refusal to
appoint a lunacy commission and hold a hearing would have
constituted an abuse of judicial discretion and grounds for
reversal. 42
IMPROPER REMARKS BY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Several 1951-1952 cases required a rather complete judicial
re-examination of the scope of permissible comment by the prose-
cution. In State v. Hoover43 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
"settled jurisprudence" that "any comment of the district attor-
ney, the result of which would be to direct attention of the jury
to the failure of the defendant to testify, is so inherently preju-
dicial an error that it cannot be cured by the trial court's instruc-
tions to the jury to disregard what they have heard."44 In so
holding, Justice Moise reviewed the jurisprudence and authorities
which have recognized this rule as a logical inference implement-
ing the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimina-
tion.45 Justice Hawthorne filed a vigorous dissent, based partially
upon the contention that the draftsman of the 1928 Code of Crim-
inal Procedure had "deliberately omitted" any provision forbid-
ding district attorney and court to discuss and comment on the
defendant's failure to testify. The intent to permit such testimony
was specifically evidenced by the commissioners' notes. 46 This
phase of Justice Hawthorne's dissenting opinion is, however, com-
pletely and logically refuted by a careful analysis of the legis-
lative history of this problem in Chief Justice Fournet's scholarly
opinion in State v. Bentley.47 The Chief Justice points out that
the redactors of the Code of Criminal Procedure had sought to
carry out their avowed intention by special provisions in Articles
384 and 385 which would have expressly recognized the right to
comment on the failure of the accused to testify. However, the
Legislature rejected this recommendation and deleted the pro-
visions inserted to accomplish that purpose. Thus the legislative
intent to reject the redactors' proposal and to adhere to the exist-
ing rule forbidding such comment was clear.
One may raise a query as to whether the Louisiana Supreme
42. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So. 2d 305 (1945).
43. 219 La. 872, 54 So. 2d 130 (1951).
44. 219 La. 872, 875, 54 So. 2d 130, 131.
45. See Comment, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 486 (1950).
46. 219 La. 872, 887, 54 So. 2d 130, 135 (1951).
47. 219 La. 893, 54 So. 2d 137 (1951).
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Court would uphold a statute which, as unsuccessfully proposed
by the 1928 commissioners, would expressly authorize comment
to the jury upon the defendant's failure to take the stand. There
is language in Chief Justice Fournet's opinion in the Bentley
case indicating a belief that such a provision might be unconsti-
tutional. Justice Moise, writing the majority opinion in the
Hoover case, announces the rule prohibiting comment as "settled
jurisprudence which stems from the Constitution." However,
those statements must be construed in the light of the issues actu-
ally presented, that is, an effort to find the proper rule in the
absence of an express statutory provision. It is very doubtful that
a majority of the Supreme Court would declare such an express
statutory authorization unconstitutional. At least we can be
sure that Justice Hawthorne would spearhead the defense of
such a statute.4
Since it is clearly settled that comment on the failure of the
accused to take the stand constitutes reversible error, let us next
view these cases to see what will constitute such comment. In
State v. Bentley the district attorney's remark that "that evidence
is uncontradicted and uncontroverted 49 was held proper-being
only a general statement of the prosecution's appreciation of the
evidence adduced at the trial. In State v. Martinez"0 the district
attorney, in his opening statement in a burglary case, declared
"Where was Louis Bommarito that night? Nobody knows but
Louis Bommarito and the police officers." In holding that this
did not constitute a direct or indirect comment on the defendant's
failure to testify, the Supreme Court stressed the fact that the
defendant could establish his whereabouts by other means than
his own testimony. The purpose of the question, reasoned the
Supreme Court, was to emphasize generally the weakness of the
defendant's explanation of his whereabouts at the time of the
crime.
In State v. Hoover,51 however, the court held that prejudicial
error was committed when the district attorney remarked that
the manner in which the defendant observed and discussed with
48. Justice Hawthorne pointed out that today the accused is permitted
to testify. Then he significantly stated, "as a rule only professional crim-
inals with records avail themselves of the privilege of staying off the witness
stand." Dissenting opinion in State v. Hoover, 219 La. 872, 887, 54 So. 2d 130,
135 (1951).
49. 219 La. 893, 897, 54 So. 2d 137, 138.
50. 220 La. 899, 913, 57 So. 2d 888, 893 (1952).
51. 219 La. 872, 54 So. 2d 130 (1951).
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counsel certain photographs of the scene of the crime, showed
that he was familiar with the actual scene of the crime. That
remark, according to Justice Moise, put the defendant on the
spot and fixed him as having been at the scene of the crime. It
forced him to take the stand to dispel the inference created. Jus-
tice Hawthorne, again dissenting, based his decision partly on a
factual conclusion that the declaration did not amount even to
an indirect comment on the defendant's failure to take the witness
stand. Justice Hamiter also agreed that the remarks made no
reference, either directly or indirectly, to the defendant's failure
to testify. It is submitted that it is difficult to distinguish the
comment in the Hoover case from that which was held proper in
State v. Martinez.
Thus we come to a second, sometimes overlapping, issue
which was discussed in this group of cases. In State v. Hoover
Justices McCaleb and Hamiter disagreed with Justice Moise's
conclusion that the district attorney's statement amounted to a
comment on the failure of accused to testify. However, they con-
curred in the finding that reversible error had been committed,
positing their conclusion on the requirement of Article 318 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure that counsel "must confine them-
selves to matters as to which evidence has been received." They
held that the district attorney's comment on the defendant's
demeanor when the photographs were exhibited constituted a
comment on evidence not adduced at the trial. The defendant's
presence in the court was not as a witness. Thus the statement
was either a prohibited statement of personal opinion or a viola-
tion of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, or
both.
Another question concerning opinion statements was pre-
sented in State v. Cascio52 where defendant appealed from a con-
viction of receiving stolen things. In his closing argument an
attorney associated with the prosecution had stated that he had
worked with the state from the beginning and "was convinced
that the accused was involved in the matter." It was evident that
the statement was based upon evidence aliunde the trial, but the
conviction was affirmed on the basis of a technical distinction.
"For the accused to be involved in the matter," declared Justice
Hawthorne, "does not necessarily mean that he is guilty of the
crime charged. One could, for instance, receive stolen property
52. 219 La. 819, 54 So. 2d 95 (1951).
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in good faith and without knowing or having reason to know that
it was stolen, and under such circumstances he would be 'involved
in the matter' although not guilty of the crime denounced by
the Statute. ' 3 On rehearing, Justice McCaleb re-examined the
case and concluded that the statement did import an opinion of
guilt. Looking to a normal construction of counsel's words and
considering the circumstances of their utterance, they would
convey an impression to the jury that counsel was convinced of
defendant's guilt. Such a statement of guilt, when not based upon
evidence adduced at the trial, would fall squarely within the
prohibition of Article 381. This conclusion as to the nature of
the statement was also concurred in by Justice Hamiter, who
dissented for other reasons. On this point it seems that the test
applied by Justice McCaleb is a correct one. The statement must
be judged by its natural effect upon the jury. Would they con-
strue it as expressing a conviction that the accused was criminally
involved?
Another somewhat novel question was involved in the Cascio
case. While Justices Hawthorne and McCaleb differed as to
whether the statement by prosecution counsel expressed a belief
in the guilt of the accused, they agreed that the defendant was
not in a position to object since defense counsel had brought on
the statement by accusing the associate counsel of being in the
case for mercenary motives. According to their view the state-
ment was a "reasonable explanation" of the associate counsel's
presence in the case-that is, that he was associated in the case
because of belief of guilt, rather than to enhance the possibilities
of a civil recovery of the value of the stolen property from the
accused. Dissenting Justice Hawthorne felt that a reasonable
explanation of the associate counsel's presence on the case did
not require an expression of his opinion of the defendant's guilt.
Actually a very close case was presented on this issue. It would
appear that the challenging of the associate prosecutor's motives
should not give him a free reign to disregard the fundamental
requirements and safeguards of Article 381.
RESPONSIVE VERDICTS
Article 405 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, "The
verdict must be responsive to the indictment, that is to say no
one can be found guilty of an offense not charged in the indict-
ment or not necessarily included in the offense included ..
53. 219 La. 819, 822, 54 So. 2d 95, 96.
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The 1948 Responsive Verdict Statute,54 which spells out the appro-
priate responsive verdicts, embraces many of the important gen-
eral crimes found in the Criminal Code. In all other cases, the
lesser and "necessarily included" offenses are determined by
well-settled tests evolved by the jurisprudence. 55 In addition to
the requirement that the offenses must be of the same general
class, all essential elements of the lesser and included crime must
be included in the definition of the offense charged. 6 This test
was logically applied in State v. Robinson57 where the accused
had been charged with unlawful possession of narcotics. 8 The
court held that "guilty of the attempted possession of a narcotics
drug" was an appropriate responsive verdict, since an attempt is
specifically defined in Article 27 of the Criminal Code as a "lesser
grade of the intended crime."5 9 However, "guilty of being an
addict" was treated as a separate and distinct offense, and hence
not appropriate as a responsive verdict to the charge of unlawful
possession of narcotics. Although both offenses are made crim-
inal by the same general narcotics statutes,6° "being a drug addict"
did not meet the test of a lesser and included offense. The basis
of the Supreme Court's decision is nicely epitomized in Chief
Justice Fournet's concluding statement: "Clearly the offense of
possessing narcotics, as defined in the act under which the defen-
dant was charged, ... [is] neither included in, nor does it in fact
have, any of the elements of the crime of being an addict." 61
SENTENCING-TWENTY-FOUR HoUR DELAY
Article 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that
"at least 24 hours shall elapse between conviction and sentence,
unless the accused waive the delay and ask for the imposition of
sentence at once." While this waiver of delay need not follow
the exact language of Article 52 1,62 it must be expressly declared.
In State v. Woods 63 the mere failure to object to the immediate
imposition of sentence did not have the effect of waiving the
54. La. R.S. 1950, 15:386.
55. Comment, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 603 (1944).
56. State v. Roberts, 213 La. 559, 35 So. 2d 216 (1948).
57. 58 So. 2d 408, 414 (La. 1952).
58. La. R.S. 1950, 40:961 et seq.
59. La. R.S. 1950, 14:27, applied in State v. Brown, 214 La. 18, 36 So. 2d 624
(1948), where attempted murder was held responsive to a murder charge.
60. La. R.S. 1950, 40:961 et seq.
61. 58 So. 2d 408, 415 (La. 1952).
62. State v. Martin, 199 La. 39, 5 So. 2d 377 (1941), finding a sufficient
waiver where the defendant stated that she was "ready for immediate
sentence."
63. 220 La. 162, 55 So. 2d 902 (1951).
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twenty-four hour delay. Resulting prejudice was shown from
the fact that defendant's motion for a new trial, a motion which
must be filed between verdict and sentence,6 4 was summarily
overruled as coming too late. The Supreme Court's theory, in
setting aside the sentence and remanding the case to the trial
court for a consideration of the defendant's motion for a new
trial, was that the sentence imposed without a twenty-four hour
delay or waiver "was premature and therefore void." Compare,
however, the situation in State v. George,6 5 decided at the prior
term of court. There the trial judge, after imposing sentence
without the prescribed delay, had granted defense counsel addi-
tional time and had fully considered a motion in arrest of judg-
ment which was overruled on its merits. While an error had
been committed by the hasty sentence, it was not a ground for
reversal since no probable miscarriage of justice or prejudice to
substantial rights of the accused had resulted.66
SUSPENSION OF MISDEMEANOR SENTENCES
In State v. Johnson6 7 a defendant who had been convicted of
false registration was given the following sentence: "I sentence
you, Jesse Johnson, to serve six months in the Parish Jail, subject
to work, and suspend all of the same except three months thereof,
upon good behavior." In arguing that a suspension of the whole
sentence had resulted, defense counsel relied on Cox v. Brown,6
where the Supreme Court had construed Article 536 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure as authorizing only an entire suspension
of sentence. In that case, the court had held that suspension of
forty days of a ninety day sentence operated to suspend the
entire sentence, with the attempted limitation to forty days being
ineffective. This windfall of a complete suspension of sentence
had never been contemplated by the sentencing judge.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to carry the principle
of the Cox v. Brown decision beyond the facts of that case. While
restating its previous ruling that Article 536 does not authorize a
partial suspension of sentence, the court refused to treat the
judge's action as an entirely suspended sentence. It held that
64. La. R.S. 1950, 15:505.
65. 218 La. 18, 48 So. 2d 265 (1950), discussed by writer in The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term, 12 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 179 (1952).
66. Applying Art. 557, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950,
15:557.
67. 220 La. 64, 55 So. 2d 782 (1951).
68. 211 La. 235, 29 So. 2d 776 (1947).
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the proper remedy, where the judge had sought to impose a par-
tial suspension of sentence, was to remand the case to the district
court for imposition of a legal sentence. Cox v. Brown was dis-
tinguished on the highly technical ground that the original
sentence imposed had been a legal one and the only question
presented in that case was the effect of a subsequent order pur-
porting to suspend a portion of the sentence remaining to be
served.
Whether the opinion in the Johnson case distinguishes or
partially overrules Cox v. Brown, the result is certainly a prefer-
able one. If the Supreme Court is wedded to the idea that Article
536 precludes a partial suspension of sentence, it is much better
to remand the case for resentencing than to permit defense coun-
sel to take advantage of the trial judge's error and secure an
entire suspension of sentence, a result which was never intended
by the trial judge. In view of the Johnson decision, it is probable
that where future sentences erroneously provide for partial sus-
pension, defendants will serve out those sentences according to
their terms-feeling that half a loaf is better than none. 69
The basic purpose of the suspended sentence is to enable a
trial judge to adjust the sentence to the exigencies of the case at
hand. Frequently, it is advisable to release a prisoner for a short
time due to his critical illness or because of an emergency situa-
tion in his family. This can best be done by a partially suspended
sentence. It would appear that Article 536 could logically be
construed as authorizing a partial suspension of sentence, since
the power to suspend the entire sentence should include the
power to suspend a portion thereof. This provision is one operat-
ing to the advantage of the accused, and so there is no reason to
apply a rule of strict construction. However, in view of Cox v.*
Brown and State v. Johnson, an amendment of Article 536 will
probably be necessary to achieve this end.
HABITUAL OFFENDERS-DRUNKEN DRIVING
The misdemeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated
does not come within the general habitual Offender law,70 which
applies only to multiple felony convictions. However, Article 98
of the Criminal Code,71 defining that offense, specifically provides
a more severe penalty for the second conviction. In State v.
69. After the Johnson case was remanded for resentencing, the trial
judge imposed an unsuspended six months sentence.
70. La. R.S. 1950, 15:529.1.
71. La. R.S. 1950, 14:98.
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Duncan7 2 the defendant had been convicted in the city court
of operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Article
98. He had been sentenced as a second offender on the basis
of a prior conviction of drunken driving in violation of a
Baton Rouge city ordinance. In remanding the case for resentenc-
ing of the defendant as a first offender, the Supreme Court held
that violation of a city ordinance prescribing a similar offense
could not be counted in fixing a second offender status. Reading
Article 98 in its entirety, the court appropriately concluded that
only prior convictions under that article are to serve as a basis
for the enhanced penalties provided. As a make-weight argument,
Chief Justice Fournet pointed out that "a statute authorizing a
more severe punishment to be inflicted upon one convicted of a
second or subsequent offense is highly penal, and should be
strictly construed and not extended in its application to cases
which do not by the strictest construction come under its pro-
visions. 78
In this regard, the general habitual offender statute is of a
much broader application. It expressly applies to any prior felony
convictions, whether they be for Louisiana, federal, or foreign
crimes.74 Also the prior felony convictions need not be for the
same crime as that for which the offender stands currently con-
victed. For example, in the recent case of State v. George75 the
defendant was sentenced as a sixth offender on the basis of five
previous felony convictions distributed among the states of Loui-
siana, Tennessee and Ohio, and ranging from automobile theft
to burglary.
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Where a motion for a new trial is based on newly discovered
evidence, the requirements of Article 511 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure must be fully complied with. Among these prerequi-
sites is a showing "that said evidence is not merely cumulative;
that it does not merely corroborate or impeach the credibility or
testimony of any witness examined at the trial .... ,,76 In State v.
Washington77 the principal ground for overruling the defendant's
motion had been that the testimony of the two newly discovered
witnesses merely tended to corroborate the defendant's own
72. 219 La. 1030, 55 So. 2d 234 (1951).
73. 219 La. 1030, 1033, 55 So. 2d 234, 235.
74. See People v. Sessone, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 473 (Co. Ct. 1939).
75. 218 La. 18, 48 So. 2d 265 (1950), discussed in The Work of the Supreme
Court for the 1950-1951 Term, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 179 (1952).
76. La. R.S. 1950, 15:511.
77. 220 La. 963, 58 So. 2d 195 (1952).
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explanation of his presence at the scene of the crime at, the time
of his arrest. Whether the language quoted from Article 511
should be construed to mean that new evidence is "cumulative"
if it merely corroborates the defendant's own unsupported testi-
mony is highly doubtful. Actually the trial judge's refusal to
grant a new trial could be, and was, amply supported by the fur-
ther finding that the new evidence related to a minor matter and
was not "so material that it ought to produce a different result
from the verdict reached"-another requirement of Article 511. In
reviewing this decision it is well to remember that new trials on
the ground of newly discovered evidence are not favored. Also,
the trial judge has a wide discretion in such cases and his refusal
to sustain a motion will not be reversed unless that discretion
has been "arbitrarily abused. '7 8
SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently and very
properly taken the view that its supervisory jurisdiction, granted
by Sections 2 and 10 of Article VII of the Louisiana Constitution,
is a plenary power which prevails over any special statutory
limitations on appellate review. For example, in State v. Doucet 79
the Supreme Court granted supervisory writs for immediate
review of an order refusing to recuse the trial judge, despite the
express provision of Article 312 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure that no such ruling should be reviewable before sentence,
either under the Supreme Court's appellate or supervisory pow-
ers. This principle was recently applied in State v. Bowie. ° The
Supreme Court issued supervisory writs and reviewed the ruling
of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, which had im-
properly sustained a motion in arrest of judgment and had set
aside a conviction for violation of the penal provisions of the
1944 Chattel Mortgage Act.81 Since no sentence had been imposed
and no question of constitutionality was raised, there was no
special basis upon which the Supreme Court would have appellate
review of the order setting aside this misdemeanor conviction.
8 2
78. State v. Saba, 203 La. 881, 14 So. 2d 751 (1943), containing a fine sum-
mation of what must be shown in order to secure a new trial on this ground.
79. 199 La. 276, 5 So. 2d 894 (1942).
80. 221 La. 41, 58 So. 2d 415 (1952).
81. La. Act 172 of 1944; La. R.S. 1950, 9:5358-5362.
82. Section 10 of Article VII of the Louisiana Constitution limits the
appellate jurisdiction of the Louisiana Supreme Court to cases involving a
question of the "legality or constitutionality" of the penalty imposed or
"where a fine exceeding $300 and imprisonment exceeding six months have
been actually imposed."
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Thus the review of the district court's ruling was under the
Supreme Court's general supervisory jurisdiction. The writs
granted in the Bowie case do not set any precedent for the
Supreme Court's acting as a general court of last resort for minor
criminal matters. Here was a case where there were special and
compelling reasons for an exercise of the exceptional supervisory
jurisdiction. An opportunity was presented to clarify the law
relating to the effect of the general saving clause which had been
enacted to do away with so-called "legislative pardons. '8 3 The
district court's erroneous ruling had thwarted justice, resulting
in the complete discharge of a properly convicted defendant. If
writs for supervisory review had not been issued the state would
have been completely remediless.
A less compelling situation was presented in State v. Brad-
ford8 4 where the Supreme Court granted writs to review the
decision of a trial judge who had improperly overruled a plea of
prescription. Justice Hawthorne dissented from the procedure
followed on the ground that the defendant should have been
relegated to his normal remedy of appeal after trial and convic-
tion. "The reason for the rule and policy of the [supreme] court
in refusing to pass upon a case of this nature in the past,"
declared Justice Hawthorne, "has been that the granting of such
a writ necessitated the trial of criminal cases piecemeal, and a
criminal prosecution would in effect be endless if a defendant
could stop the proceedings against him at every stage of the trial
at which a ruling is made against him,-on a plea of prescrip-
tion, plea of unconstitutionality of a statute, motion to quash,
etc. I see no reason for making an exception to the rule in this
case." 85 Probably the majority of the court were of the opinion
that the novelty of the issue presented, plus the special circum-
stance that the original record of the case failed to show who was
at fault in delaying the prosecution, justified the exceptional
relief granted. The Bradford decision may unduly encourage
defense counsel to seek writs for immediate review of adverse
preliminary rulings. However, the Supreme Court was exercising
a completely discretionary power, and hence this one holding does
not establish any general precedent for such relief.
83. La. R.S. 1950, 24:171.
84. 219 La. 1090, 55 So. 2d 255 (1951).
85. 219 La. 1090, 1094, 55 So. 2d 255, 256.
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